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INTRODUCTION
Among the desired features of any legal regime, legitimacy is
surely near the top. To be just, a legal system must be legitimate.
Taken at its most basic level, legitimacy refers to the authority of the
law or legal system to issue binding (or near binding) commands.
The legal commands to do or refrain from some action carry a type
of moral weight; they cannot simply be ignored. An illegitimate
regime lacks this authority and moral weight; its prescriptions do
not command the same type of obedience and respect. Without
legitimacy, a law’s commands lack moral force and may amount to
nothing more than unjust coercion.
The international human rights regime is no different. As a
system of laws, we must know whether it is legitimate—whether
*BYU Law School, J.D. Candidate, April 2022. Brigham Young University, B.A. 2014.
Fordham University, M.A. 2016, Ph.D. 2021. My thanks to Eric T. Jensen, David H. Moore,
Stephen R. Grimm, Leah Blake, Emma Wilcox, and all the editors at BYU Law Review who
helped improve this piece. All errors are mine.
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its prescriptions carry the requisite moral and legal authority. In
other words, can the commands of international law become
genuinely binding with respect to international human rights? In
some ways, this question seems to answer itself: if any legal system
has legitimacy (the authority to bind), surely it is one protecting
against human rights abuses. But this misunderstands the way in
which a legal system can lack legitimacy. A law promoting good
ends may indeed be illegitimate. The fact that a legal system
attempts to protect something as important as human rights does
not—standing alone—guarantee its legitimacy. More must be
shown. But what? And why think that international human rights
need any defense as a legitimate legal system?
For one thing, the international legal regime as a whole is in
poor shape. True, public international law has never faced a
shortage of critics.1 But even by historical standards, recent political
movements have placed international institutions under enormous
scrutiny. At the popular level, survey data indicates that “citizen
attitudes in most countries [concerning international
organizations] have become less positive over time,” along
a number of dimensions.2 Some scholars describe the situation
as an “unprecedented opposition to post-war international
governance.”3 This opposition takes various forms, and it does not
1. One of the most common and persistent objections is that public international law
is not truly “law” since it lacks a single sovereign who can issue commands and back them
up with the possibility of sanction. See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED 117–18, 171 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) (“[T]he
law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given
sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author. . . . [T]he law obtaining
between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general opinion.”). Austin’s view stems
from his essentialist definition of law as the command of a sovereign. But this definition
alone does not secure the skepticism of public international law that Austin has become
famous for, because we could accept multiple levels of sovereigns or that a group of
sovereigns can bind themselves or others through collective action. Austin’s skepticism,
therefore, seems to also require that a sovereign cannot be subject to any other institution,
except through choice of will—i.e., a sovereign cannot be bound. But we might wonder
whether this merely begs the question through analytic definition, especially in the
contemporary legal context, where public international law continues to stretch into
new domains.
2. David H. Bearce & Brandy J. Jolliff Scott, Popular Non-Support for International
Organizations: How Extensive and What Does This Represent? 14 REV. INT’L ORGS. 187, 189 (2019)
(utilizing data from the International Social Survey Programme’s National Identity module,
fielded in 1995, 2003, and 2013).
3. Liesbet Hooghe, Tobias Lenz & Gary Marks, Contested World Order: The
Delegitimation of International Governance, 14 REV. INT’L ORGS. 731, 739 (2018).
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reflect a neat left-right ideological divide.4 Similarly, this
opposition does not simply relate to particular laws or policies,
though of course those issues remain prominent.5 Rather, many are
skeptical about the value of international law and international
institutions in general.6
The international human rights regime faces similar skepticism,
including from those committed to the cause of human rights. For
example, despite its prominent military and diplomatic presence
around the world, the United States has refused to become party to
some multilateral human rights treaties or to accept the jurisdiction
of international tribunals that may be useful in promoting human
rights.7 It has also accused international organizations, like the U.N.
Human Rights Council, of hypocrisy and of making the cause of
human rights worse rather than better.8 It is not hard to see why.
For example, despite the glaring human rights abuses by China
against the Uyghurs of Xinjiang and the people of Hong Kong,
the U.N. Human Rights Council has issued no resolutions
condemning China’s behavior.9 And Michelle Bachelet, the U.N.
4. Id. at 737.
5. See, e.g., YANIS VAROUFAKIS, ADULTS IN THE ROOM: MY BATTLE WITH THE
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DEEP ESTABLISHMENT (2017) (addressing the EU’s response to the
Greek debt crisis following the 2008 global recession); JACKIE SMITH & DAWN WIEST, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION 52–56,
73–74 (2012) (criticizing international financial systems as insensitive to problems of
inequality, development, workers’ rights, and environmental concerns).
6. For example, many feminists argue that the state-centric nature of international
law entrenches the power of men, because “in its current manifestations the state is a
problematic institution” that overly represents the interests of men. See Hilary Charlesworth,
Feminist Critiques of International Law and Their Critics, 13 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1994).
7. For example, the United States is the sole country not to ratify the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, despite playing a prominent role in its drafting. See Hailing Somalia’s
Ratification, UN Renews Call for Universalization of Child Rights Treaty, UN NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/10/511312-hailing-somalias-ratification-un-renewscall-universalization-child-rights. The United States has also refused to ratify the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and at times has used “aggressive diplomacy” to
“shield American citizens, policies, and sovereignty from international oversight.” Jean
Galbraith, The Bush Administration’s Response to the International Criminal Court, 21 BERKELEY
J. INT’L L. 683, 683 (2003).
8. See Security Council Meetings Coverage, Rising Nationalism Threatens
Multilateralism’s 70-Year ‘Proven Track Record’ of Saving Lives, Preventing Wars, SecretaryGeneral Tells Security Council, United Nations 8395TH Meeting (AM) SC/13570 (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13570.doc.htm.
9. Geneva Discords: China and America Prepare for a Human-Rights Showdown at the UN,
THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 8, 2022), https://www.economist.com/china/2022/01/08/china-andamerica-prepare-for-a-human-rights-showdown-at-the-un.
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High Commissioner for Human Rights, has not been granted free
access to Xinjiang to investigate.10 What is more, China itself
currently holds a seat on the Human Rights Council, along with
some other notorious human rights abusers such as Cuba, Eritrea,
Kazakhstan, Libya, Russia, Somalia, Sudan, and Venezuela.11 In
part because of these problems, the United States even went so far
as to withdraw from the Human Rights Council in 2018,12 though it
decided to reengage in 2021.13
An additional worry has been around for a long time. A
perennial criticism of international human rights law is that it
reflects an overly “western” set of values that is being forced on the
rest of the world.14 For example, when the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) was being drafted, the Executive Board of
the American Anthropological Association expressed the worry
that the UDHR was nothing more than “a statement of rights
conceived only in terms of the values prevalent in the countries of
Western Europe and America[.]”15 Their skepticism grew out of the
belief that “standards and values are relative to the culture from
which they derive[,]” such that “[w]hat is held to be a human right
in one society may be regarded as anti-social by another people, or
by the same people in a different period of their history.”16 A
slightly different—and far stronger—criticism is that even if human
rights standards are universal, their specific content is not
universally accepted. Human rights treaties use broad, aspirational
language. Providing that language with a definite application—as

10. Id.
11. Membership of the Human Rights Council for the 16th Cycle, 1 January–31 December
2022, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/Pages/CurrentMembers.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2022).
12. See Gardiner Harris, Trump Administration Withdraws U.S. from U.N. Human Rights
Council, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/
us/politics/trump-israel-palestinians-human-rights.html.
13. Bill Chappell, Biden Orders U.S. to Reengage with U.N. Human Rights
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/08/
Council ‘Immediately’, N.P.R. (Feb. 8, 2021, 8:12
965314723/biden-orders-u-s-to-reengage-with-u-n-human-rights-council-immediately.
14. See, e.g., KISHORE MAHBUBANI, CAN ASIANS THINK? (1998); Fareed
Zakaria, A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, FOREIGN AFFS. (Mar./Apr. 1994),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1994-03-01/conversation-lee-kuan-yew-0.
15. The Exec. Bd., Am. Anthropological Ass’n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 539 (1947).
16. Id. at 542.
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required in legal adjudication—requires more than agreement
on abstractions.
The purpose of this Note is to shed light on these criticisms
through the framework of legitimacy. And I will argue that, by
getting clear on the normative issues, we can begin to address these
criticisms for the international human rights regime. Specifically, I
argue that we need a robust justificatory framework for human
rights that situates them as something like jus cogens—
international norms whose legal force derives, significantly, from
their intrinsic content. In Part I of this Note, I will provide a
framework for understanding these criticisms by discussing one
prominent conception of legitimacy: Joseph Raz’s “service
conception.” Raz’s view has two components: (1) a legitimate legal
institution must be better situated to promote just behavior than
individuals (or states) acting unilaterally, and (2) this comparative
advantage applies in areas where it is more important to act
correctly than to act independently of the law. A legitimate legal
system thus provides those under its domain with a unique moral
reason to obey the laws.
In Part II, I will show how Raz’s notion of legitimacy can help
elucidate—and unify—the multi-faceted criticisms of the
international human rights regime. Specifically, I will discuss how
his independence condition captures criticisms of international law
from those concerned about state sovereignty and those concerned
about the indeterminateness of human rights guarantees. And I will
argue that Raz’s focus on comparative advantage helps elucidate a
common criticism about the ineffectiveness—or outright negative
effects—of the human rights enforcement and monitoring regime.
Finally, in Part III, I will address possible solutions. Having
clarified some of the normative issues at stake, I will argue that we
can begin to address them—especially those related to the
independence condition—by providing a robust theory of the
justification of human rights. Specifically, I will argue that
international human rights need a justificatory framework that
turns them into something like peremptory norms of international
law. A peremptory norm is a non-derogable, universal standard
whose legal force stems, essentially, from its intrinsic content. If
human rights could gain a sufficiently strong justification that
establishes them as something like jus cogens, then this would
address concerns about state sovereignty, indeterminateness, and
1829
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even (to some weak degree) enforcement. Providing such a
justification goes beyond my aims, but I hope to make clear why
one is needed, for many see the lack of justification for human rights
as a distinctive virtue. But getting clear on the demands of
legitimacy suggests the opposite.
I. LEGITIMACY ON RAZ’S SERVICE CONCEPTION
A. Normative and Positive Legitimacy
First, a preliminary distinction: a law or legal institution can be
legitimate in two different senses—positive and normative. A legal
system is legitimate in the positive sense when it is accepted as
legitimate or authoritative by those under its control. Legitimacy in
this sense requires that those under the thumb of legal power have
certain beliefs about the institution or perceive its actions in a
certain way that lends it prestige.17 Positive legitimacy also
normally requires the belief that one is obligated to obey the
commands of the law, given the acceptance of its authority. The
reasons for these beliefs can vary. But what matters on a positive
account of legitimacy is whether a legal system is accepted as
legitimate by those it claims to govern.
A normative conception of legitimacy focuses on whether a
state actually has the right to rule, regardless of what people believe
about it. Every citizen of the United States may believe that the U.S.
legal system is legitimate (that it has the right to rule) and yet it may
not be legitimate. What matters in a normative conception of
legitimacy is specifying the conditions under which a legal
institution has the right to rule—when it is legitimate—and then
seeing whether a particular institution measures up. Whatever
normative legitimacy requires, whether a state meets those
requirements depends on facts about justice—the beliefs of citizens

17. See MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 382
(Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., The Free Press 1964) (1947)
(“[T]he basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness
to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.
The composition of this belief is seldom altogether simple. In the case of ‘legal authority,’ it
is never purely legal.”). For a contemporary account in Weber’s style, see Jonas Tallberg &
Michael Zürn, The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations: Introduction and
Framework, 14 REV. INT’L ORGS. 581, 583 (2019) (conceptualizing legitimacy as “observable
empirical phenomena,” rooted in “actors’ perception of an institution’s authority”).
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do not matter.18 A state may be entirely legitimate from a normative
point of view but lack popular support. The question of normative
legitimacy is one about justice, not widespread approval.19
This is not to say that the two conceptions of legitimacy have
nothing to do with one another. For example, it may be that one
component of normative legitimacy requires the state to justify
itself to its citizens on grounds they can accept (similar to public
reason theories), in which case citizens’ beliefs would be relevant
though not constitutive of legitimacy.20 Moreover, there is no
doubting the political and moral importance of a widespread belief
that a legal institution is legitimate. Without that belief, citizens are
less likely to buy into the legal regime and self-regulate, creating
massive problems of legal enforcement and risking violent social
upheaval. And in an ideal scenario, the belief that a legal institution
is legitimate would be justified on the same grounds as the facts
giving rise to its legitimacy. In other words, the ideal situation is
one in which a legal institution is in fact legitimate and citizens
believe it is for precisely that reason. The point, though, is that

18. Not just any reason—not even any moral reason—will establish legitimacy. For
example, I may have a moral reason to obey the commands of the state because, if I do not,
the state will murder my family. But these more “prudential” reasons are not what
establishes legitimacy. We are looking for a specific kind of moral reason to obey, one that
has to do with the fact the state commanded obedience, rather than the consequences for
disobeying. See Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2006).
19. It may even be the case that a legitimate authority is not the de facto authority. Raz
gives the case of the exiled Polish government in London during 1940, which was arguably
the legitimate legal authority in Poland but was not the de facto authority. Id. at 1005.
20. John Rawls, for example, endorsed what he called the “liberal principle of
legitimacy,” which states: “[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable
to their common human reason.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (Expanded Edition
2005). In other words, any exercise of political power must meet this condition: it must be
the result of an overall political system that all reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse.
In this way, Rawls ties concerns about legitimacy with what citizens have reason to accept.
But note that even on this view, Rawls does not require actual endorsement of a political
constitution for coercive measures to be legitimate. Instead, the constitution must be one that
all citizens “can . . . be expected to endorse[,]” even if they in fact reject it. Id. at 140. In
contemporary public reason theories, this is known as idealization: coercion need not be
accepted to be justified, but it must be that idealized citizens would accept it under the right
conditions. For one example of such an account, see GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON:
A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD 250–77 (2011).
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whatever importance we may attach to a positive account of
legitimacy, normative questions are different.
I will focus on the normative conception of legitimacy, though
I will briefly sketch a link between this and the positive conception
through the lens of voluntary compliance with international law.
B. Raz and the Result of Legitimacy
There is no shortage of accounts specifying what it means for a
legal institution to be legitimate. While important, figuring out the
right account is not my concern here. Instead, I will focus on a
particularly prominent account in the philosophical literature that
has also played a role in the (somewhat limited) discussion of the
legitimacy of international law.21 This account, known as the
“service conception,” comes from Joseph Raz.22 While I will express
some criticisms of the service conception, I will largely assume it as
true for the sake of argument. With its focus on comparative
benefits and the reasons provided by legitimate institutions, it
provides a useful framework, especially since the criticisms of
international human rights law often track Raz’s conditions
for legitimacy.
On Raz’s service conception, the question of legitimacy equates
with who has the authority to issue commands to others—who has
the right to rule. Authority is not taken for granted; it must be
explained and justified. We must specify the conditions under
which an institution can have such authority, rather than merely
assume it. This concern for legitimacy comes from understanding
what authority amounts to: it allows a legal institution to issue
commands that morally bind those under its power, and it can even
justify using coercion to induce obedience.23 If a legal institution is
21. See, e.g., Andreas Follesdal, The Legitimate Authority of International Courts and Its
Limits: A Challenge to Raz’s Service Conception?, in LEGAL AUTHORITY BEYOND THE STATE 188
(Patrick Capps & Henrik Palmer Olsen eds., 2018); John Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of
International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010).
22. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM ch. 2 (1986); Raz, The Problem of
Authority, supra note 18.
23. While this link between legitimacy and the justification of coercion is not immediate,
it becomes much easier to argue that a state is justified in coercing citizens to obey when the
legal regime is legitimate. As such, even if it is the case that meeting the requirements of
legitimacy does not justify coercive methods, it makes that bar much easier to clear. But I will
ignore these issues throughout the paper, as they are not essential to my view.
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legitimate or has this authority, it has the normative power to issue
commands that bind those under its domain, or at least the power
to create strong moral reasons to obey.24 Of course, there can be
illegitimate exercises of authority—imagine any corrupt
government terrorizing its citizens into compliance. But what
interests Raz is the possibility of legitimate exercises of authority,
where the fact that a legal institution requires X creates an
obligation to do X.25 If international human rights law is legitimate,
then the fact that it requires compliance with basic human rights
entails a moral obligation to comply. As an obligation, compliance
is not merely a pragmatic judgment about costs and benefits. In
other words, one could have reasons to obey the dictates of a tyrant
(say, to avoid being murdered) that do not amount to a moral
obligation. But a moral obligation has a peculiar force, one that goes
beyond merely prudential considerations. A legitimate exercise of
authority creates an obligation to obey precisely because it is a
legitimate exercise of authority.
A slightly weaker version of Raz’s account takes the commands
of a legitimate authority to be moral reasons to obey, rather than
moral obligations. John Tasioulas, while discussing Raz’s account
in the context of international law, goes this route: “A has legitimate
authority over B when A’s directives are content-independent and
exclusionary reasons for action for B.”26 In other words, if
international human rights law is legitimate, then the fact that it
commands some action is itself a reason (rather than an obligation)
for doing that action. Because the reason is content-independent,
we do not need to analyze the specific action it commands: the mere
fact that the law requires it provides a reason for obedience. And it
provides a special type of reason—an exclusionary reason. An
exclusionary reason is a second-order reason that “excludes” some
first-order reason or reasons from consideration.27 Or, as Tasioulas
24. Raz, The Problem of Authority, supra note 18, at 1012.
25. Id.
26. Tasioulas, The Legitimacy of International Law, supra note 21, at 98; see also Allen
Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79,
84 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010) (“The . . . very robust requirement of a
content-independent moral obligation to comply with rules is not needed . . . . The weaker
combination of a . . . substantial content-independent reason not to interfere, along with
substantial content-independent moral reasons to comply . . . does the job.”).
27. For an influential description and discussion of this concept, see JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35–48 (1975).

1833

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

puts it, exclusionary reasons should not simply be “weighed along
with other reasons that apply[,]” because they “have the normative
effect of excluding at least some countervailing reasons.”28 As an
example, if I promise to return a book on Friday, that promise
constitutes an exclusionary reason: I may have other good reasons
to keep the book until Saturday (perhaps I’m not finished), but
those do not factor into my decision—the promise I made excludes
these reasons. An exclusionary reason is simply a particularly
strong or important reason that both speaks in favor (or against)
some action but also insulates other reasons by making
them irrelevant.
Tasioulas’s weaker formulation has the benefit of flexibility: a
legitimate legal institution does not create moral obligations but
rather provides strong moral reasons to obey. On this weaker
account, international human rights or other legal institutions stand
a better chance of being legitimate. While that may not count as a
reason for selecting Tasioulas’s conception over others, my concern
is to showcase problems for the legitimacy of international human
rights law and potential solutions. Since those problems will
presumably multiply on stronger conceptions of legitimacy, I will
use his weaker notion of exclusionary reasons. If there are problems
for international human rights on this weaker account of legitimacy,
they should apply with greater force to stronger accounts.
Putting it all together, we can grasp some necessary conditions
for legitimate institutions on Raz’s service conception: if a legal
institution is legitimate, then the fact that it commands X
constitutes an exclusionary moral reason for those under the
domain of that institution to X.29 In other words, a legitimate
institution provides a unique type of reason for obeying its
commands. A legitimate legal institution provides a moral reason to
obey, rather than merely a pragmatic reason. And it provides a
moral reason to obey simply in virtue of commanding that
obedience, not because of the specific content of the command
(though that can become relevant). Finally, the reason to obey is of
a peculiar force: as an exclusionary reason, it not only speaks in favor
of obedience but also insulates other reasons from consideration.
28. See Tasioulas, supra note 21, at 98.
29. Specifying what counts as the “domain” of that institution, and why the
exclusionary reason only extends that far, would of course be necessary in a full explication
of this idea. But I will leave those problems aside.
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C. Two Conditions of a Legitimate Institution
Thus far, Raz has provided the necessary condition of a
legitimate legal system: if a legal institution is legitimate, its
commands have a certain moral force. But how can a legal
institution reach this exalted state? How can a state’s commands
constitute exclusionary moral reasons? Raz provides two
conditions. First, it must be the case that a person “would better
conform to reasons that apply to him anyway . . . if he intends to be
guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not.”30 By
following the institution’s commands, I will better conform with
those reasons that apply to me anyway than I would without the
legal institution. There are a multitude of reasons that apply to me
that command or suggest various actions—my current set of
reasons, for example, commands that I not steal my neighbor’s car.
Those reasons apply to me categorically because they do not
depend on whether I want to steal it. And on this first condition, a
law against stealing is legitimate if I (and others) will better
conform with those reasons by following the law than I would by
ignoring it and attempting to follow my own moral reasoning. In
other words, by following the law, I will better conform with justice
than if I relied on my own judgment. A legitimate legal institution
provides a comparative advantage in bringing about just behavior.
Second, the reasons satisfying the first condition must be in an
area where “it is better to conform to reason than to decide for
oneself, unaided by authority[.]”31 This “independence condition”
limits the first condition.32 The independence condition requires
that the decisions being made by a legal institution are ones where
it is more important to be right than to choose for yourself. Think, for
example, of the decision of whom to marry. One may very well get
that decision wrong, objectively, from the standpoint of practical
reason (assuming there are wrong answers). But it is more
important to make that decision oneself, rather than have the law
make it for you—even if the law would ensure you got that choice
right. The service conception does not amount to a full-blown
deference to the law. Instead, in those areas where it is more
important to act correctly than to act free of legal requirement, a
30. Raz, The Problem of Authority, supra note 18, at 1014.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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law is legitimate if it better promotes just actions than individual
decision-making would. Raz gives the example of pharmaceutical
regulations: I can best avoid harming myself by complying with the
regulations about the use of pharmaceuticals, and it is more
important to act correctly in this regard (to avoid serious harm)
than it is to choose without legal constraints. As such, I should
listen to the experts and follow the rules.33 These rules are
legitimate because they better promote correct action in an area
where it is less important to act free from legal directives than it is
to act correctly.
D. Tying the Strands of the Service Conception
Pulling it all together, Raz’s service conception is as follows: A
legal institution is legitimate if the fact that it commands X provides
a content-independent, exclusionary moral reason to X. And a legal
institution can reach this point by providing citizens with a
comparative advantage in following reason in situations where it
is more important that they act correctly than that they choose
for themselves.
Raz’s service conception has its flaws. On his view, legitimacy
basically amounts to paternalism—the government is legitimate if
it can help us choose the right when we might otherwise choose
poorly.34 Even with his independence condition, which limits the
reach of this paternalism, it is not clear why acting in accordance
with reason should play the central role in an account of legitimacy
to the exclusion of other concerns. Especially in today’s democratic
climate, consent of the governed (or other procedural concerns)
would appear to matter at least as much as the comparative
expertise or usefulness of the state in promoting moral behavior.
And the service conception appears to further divide the positive
and normative accounts of legitimacy. Empirical research on
positive legitimacy, for example, usually focuses on the level of
trust in government, beliefs about corruption, the extent of political
participation, and the like.35 Whether a legal institution is likely

33. Id. at 1014–15.
34. Though Raz’s notion of paternalism is still decidedly liberal, given its emphasis on
autonomy. See, e.g., RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 22.
35. See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72
Countries, 45 EUROPEAN J. POL. RSCH. 499, 505 (2006) (listing indicators of legitimacy).
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to better equip a citizen to behave justly probably never enters
the minds of those who assess their governments as legitimate
or illegitimate.
But the service conception does capture something important—
on Raz’s view, substance matters. It is true that if a legal institution
is legitimate, the substance of the commands does not figure into
whether those commands provide exclusionary reasons for
obedience. But it is also true that for a legal institution to be
legitimate, it must give citizens a better chance at acting justly than
they would have on their own. In other words, for a legal institution
to be legitimate, we must know whether it really promotes justice,
whether it generally helps individuals act in accordance with
reason. In contemporary jargon, Raz’s view places a premium on
the concerns of “substantive justice”—whether a legal institution
gets the law correct as a matter of content, not just as a matter of
form.36 This much is certainly entailed by the definition of
legitimacy as Raz understands it: if a legal institution’s commands
provide moral reasons to obey, then that legal institution must
generally promote just actions (even if we do not analyze the
content of each individual command, one-by-one). Otherwise, we
would not only lack reasons to obey the commands of the law, but
we would have moral reasons not to.
But for my purposes, the key value of Raz’s conception is its
descriptive power. Whatever its flaws, Raz is certainly correct that
comparative advantage and the reach of the law (“independence”)
are important factors in showing that a legal system is legitimate.
And more importantly, his two conditions of legitimacy line up
well with the criticisms of the international human rights regime.
II. LEGITIMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
On the service conception, a legal regime is legitimate if its
commands generate exclusionary reasons to obey. And to reach
that status, a legal system must provide a comparative advantage
in acting justly in areas where it is more important to act
correctly than to act independently. While Raz’s view lends itself

36. Perhaps so much that procedural justice plays too little role, at least with respect
to legitimacy. On this issue of the weighing of substantive versus procedural justice see Zofia
Stemplowska & Adam Swift, Dethroning Democratic Legitimacy, in 4 OXFORD STUD. IN POL.
PHIL. 3 (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall eds., 2018).
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straightforwardly to analyses of domestic legal systems, some
alterations must be made at the international level. First,
comparative advantage. At the international level, the issue is not
simply whether individuals would have a comparative advantage in
acting justly when following the laws (though that could be
relevant). Rather, it seems more natural to say that international
law has a comparative advantage when it allows states to act in
accordance with reasons that apply to them than they would have
otherwise. So, for example, in areas where collective action may be
mutually beneficial, yet difficult to obtain, international law can
solve this by providing a uniform standard of behavior. Without
this distinction, then an analysis of legitimacy at the international
stage would simply be duplicative: if some law would provide a
comparative advantage, then the international legal system would
be legitimate (without asking whether a national or international
law would be best).
The same issue arises for the independence condition. On the
domestic level, it entailed that a system is legitimate only when it
provides a comparative advantage for individuals in those areas
where it is more important that they act correctly than
independently. Yet at the international level, human rights laws
(overwhelmingly) govern states, not individuals. As a result, Raz’s
conception should be altered to account for this. We can alter his
independence condition such that for international laws to be
legitimate, they must address an area where it is more important
for states to act correctly than to act independently.
As I will argue below, these two conditions—adjusted for
international law—align quite well with common criticisms of
international human rights law.
A. Comparative Advantage
First, comparative advantage. At the international level, this
means that the international human rights regime must provide a
comparative advantage in securing human rights than a purely
national regime or no regime at all.37
One consistent problem for the international human rights
regime on this score is the paucity of enforcement mechanisms.
37. This of course assumes that (1) states can have reasons, (2) human rights norms can
provide such reasons, and (3) those reasons are sufficient to dictate a certain course of action.
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Or, to put it more bluntly, the worst human rights abusers often get
little more than a finger wag from international human rights
institutions. Taken abstractly, the enforcement ability of any legal
institution can have key benefits or drawbacks for its legitimacy.
Consistent enforcement of a law increases the likelihood that the
law will achieve its ends.38 Imagine for example a law that provided
high taxes on smoking to force smokers to internalize the external
costs of their behavior. Without enforcement, this internalization
would never happen. Though on the flip side, consistent
enforcement can also mean that unjust laws are effectively
implemented—oppressive laws are enforced along with just ones.
Consistent enforcement can thus be both a help and a hindrance,
and much depends on the content of the law in question. But in the
abstract, the ability to enforce laws consistently—or the ability to
induce compliance with the law—is important on the service
conception. If legitimacy requires that a legal institution can better
promote just behavior than acting unilaterally, then the ability of
the law to induce compliance could very well be crucial.
On this score, international law generally and human rights law
in particular face serious challenges. For starters, international
courts generally lack jurisdiction over nation-states without their
consent. And even if states give consent, enforcement can still
prove difficult if not purely symbolic. Under the U.N. Charter, the
Security Council has the power to institute forcible and non-forcible
measures “as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”39 And all members of the United Nations must
“undertake to make available” to the Security Council the
necessary resources to achieve this purpose.40 But this power is
limited in scope and has never been used. While the United Nations
has found ways—primarily through the Security Council—to
promote international peacekeeping and protection of human
rights, its success is far from clear. To take some of the most
egregious failures, in response to the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the early 1990s, the Security Council issued
38. Assuming, of course, that enforcement can attain some end. If the aims of law are
purely symbolic, enforcement would not achieve any distinctly legal end. But a number of
purposes can be assisted by enforcement, for example deterrence, retribution, etc.
39. U.N. Charter arts. 41–42.
40. Id. at art. 43, ¶ 1. Additionally, all U.N. members are obliged by the Charter to
“accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” Id. at art. 25.
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resolution 819 which demanded “that all parties and others
concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area
which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile
act[.]”41 To enforce this “safe area,” the Security Council called
upon the Secretary-General to increase the presence of U.N.
peacekeeping troops in the area.42 Despite this resolution and the
presence of U.N. peacekeeping forces, thousands were massacred.
And in the case of Rwanda, the Security Council simply “refused
to recognize that genocide was being perpetrated against the Tutsi
in Rwanda and failed in its responsibilities to reinforce the U.N.
peacekeeping mission [there] in order to protect as many innocent
civilians as possible.”43 To be sure, in each case, the Security Council
initiated international criminal tribunals to bring (at least some of)
the perpetrators of these acts to justice. Yet the Security Council also
failed to prevent these atrocities when it was aware of them, taking
only meager steps to avoid them.
I do not wish to overstate this point. In the famous words of
Louis Henkin, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the
time.”44 The level of compliance and the capabilities of enforcement
vary by the area of international law: for example, treaties with
specifically tailored dispute-resolution mechanisms can be very
effective in inducing compliance.45 And the issue is whether
international law better induces compliance with justice than its
absence (or an alternative) would. Yet when gaps in enforcement
come about in the realm of human rights law—those that result in
some of the most egregiously unjust outcomes—these benefits
diminish. And given the moral catastrophes in the last century, this
41. S.C. Res. 819, ¶ 1 (Apr. 16, 1993).
42. Id. at ¶ 4.
43. Rwandan Genocide: Security Council Told Failure of Political Will Led to ‘Cascade of
Human Tragedy,’ U.N. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/
04/466342-rwandan-genocide-security-council-told-failure-political-will-led-cascadehuman (quoting Colin Keating, former Permanent Representative of New Zealand, which
held the presidency of the Security Council during the Rwandan Genocide).
44. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979).
45. Investor-state dispute settlement is one area that seems to be fairly successful, such
as in the North American Free Trade Agreement and (presumably) its successor, the United
States–Mexico–Canada agreement. See, e.g., United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement ch.
31, Dec. 10, 2019, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween.
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lack of enforcement becomes all the more troubling. Or, to put it
more squarely in Raz’s terms, a system which fails to provide
mechanisms for avoiding the worst outcomes may very well lack a
comparative advantage in bringing about just behavior.
For international human rights law more specifically, the
formal mechanisms to enforce compliance are very thin. Under the
ICCPR, states are required to provide remedies for violations of the
Convention,46 but it is up to the states to select and implement those
remedies when they deem it necessary. The only means to
“enforce” this obligation—apart from international shaming or
diplomatic pressure—comes from the Human Rights Committee,
which can ask for explanations of “the remedy, if any, that may
have been taken” by a state.47 The Committee cannot enforce any
remedies on its own. Moreover, both the European Court of
Human Rights48 as well as the Human Rights Committee49 will
generally not hear a case unless domestic remedies have been
exhausted, requiring any potential claimant to first face the
gauntlet of domestic litigation. For violations of human rights, the
state itself is the primary means of enforcement, not
international bodies. But since international human rights law
primarily restrains the behavior of states, the states themselves
get to adjudicate the rightfulness of their own behavior.
With consistent human rights violators, this is little promise of
achieving a just outcome.
It may be, moreover, that the international human rights
apparatus is not only thin on enforcement capabilities but
positively harmful to the cause of human rights. The United States
has recently made claims like this. In 2018, the United States
completely withdrew from the U.N. Human Rights Council
alleging it was a “hypocritical and self-serving organization that
46. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 3, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
47. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4,
¶ 2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
see also Yaker v. France, Communication No. 2747/2016, Human Rights Committee,
¶¶ 10–11 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f123%2fD%2f2747%2f2016&Lang=en (illustrating
the practice of deferring to states with respect to selecting and implementing a remedy).
48. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
35(1), opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
49. ICCPR art. 41, ¶ 1(c).

1841

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:6 (2022)

makes a mockery of human rights,” and that its behavior “damages
the cause of human rights”50 and threatens the “council’s
legitimacy.”51 The complaint centered on allegations that the
Human Rights Council provides a platform for anti-Israel bias
while shielding the worst human rights abusers from scrutiny.52 As
U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley pointed out, “It’s hard to accept that
[the Human Rights Council] has never considered a resolution on
Venezuela, and yet it adopted five biased resolutions in March
against a single country, Israel.”53
Part of the problem is that some of the worst human rights
abusers are also some of the most powerful states, and the
international system gives a disproportionate power to some of
these actors. Great power politics still dominates the international
arena.54 Powerful states can use their economic and political might
to secure more favorable terms in treaties or bully other countries
into shying away from open criticism of corrupt behavior. Recently,
for example, China has attempted to “throttle” the economy of
Lithuania for its decision to use “Taiwan” to describe the
Taiwanese embassy, instead of the Chinese sanctioned term “Taipei

50. Colin Dwyer, U.S. Announces Its Withdrawal from U.N. Human Rights Council, NPR
(June
19,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/19/621435225/u-s-announces-itswithdrawal-from-u-n-s-human-rights-council (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Nikki Haley).
51. Merrit Kennedy, Trump Administration Warns That U.S. May Pull Out of U.N.
Human Rights Council, NPR (June 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/06/06/531752892/trump-administration-warns-that-u-s-may-pull-out-of-u-nhuman-rights-council (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley).
52. See Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Rising Nationalism Threatens
Multilateralism’s 70-Year ‘Proven Track Record’ of Saving Lives, Preventing Wars,
Secretary-General Tells Security Council, U.N. Meeting Coverage SC/13570 (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13570.doc.htm (“‘[M]ultilateralism is not good in
and of itself but is a means to an end.’ That principle fails when it does not support the goals
of peace, security and human rights, or when United Nations bodies such as the Human
Rights Council give abusive regimes a pass. Those activities do not deserve the support of
the United States . . . .”); see also UN: Deny Rights Council Seats to Major Violators, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/08/un-deny-rights-councilseats-major-violators.
53. Kennedy, supra note 51 (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley).
54. See Christopher Layne, Coming Storms: The Return of Great-Power War, FOREIGN
AFFS. (Nov./Dec. 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-1013/coming-storms.
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Representative Office.”55 More formally, the United States, Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, and China all have permanent
positions on the Security Council,56 as well as effective vetoes over
any non-procedural matters.57 The dissenting vote of any
permanent member will kill a Security Council resolution. And the
U.N. General Assembly—in some ways the most democratic organ
of the United Nations—cannot pass or enforce laws; it can only
make recommendations or issue resolutions with no legal force.58
While these functions are important, the structure of the U.N.
Charter allows a single powerful state to hold back the full weight
of international law, as Russia did in 2015 when it vetoed a
resolution to establish an international tribunal to prosecute those
responsible for shooting down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17.59
B. The Independence Condition
A number of criticisms can also take shape under the
independence condition of legitimacy. At its broadest, a criticism of
international human rights under this prong would look like the
following: human rights, whatever their value, should not be the
subject of international law because, at least at the international
level, it is more important that states act for themselves. Yet one can
endorse this overall view from a variety of vantage points. For
example, those who worry about the international legal regime as
supplanting state sovereignty can be thought of as criticizing
international law for addressing areas where it does not belong. Yet
that very same person may be committed to the cause of human
rights, simply at the national level. The United States, for example,
often seems to represent some weak version of this view. As noted
above, despite its commitment to human rights at home and
abroad,60 it has refused to ratify some human rights treaties, and it

55. What China’s Bullying of Lithuania Reveals About Europe, ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2022,
Edition, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/01/22/what-chinas-bullying-of-lithuaniareveals-about-europe.
56. See U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
57. See id. at art. 27, ¶ 3.
58. See U.N. Charter arts. 9–17.
59. See U.N. SCOR, 70th Sess., 7498th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 7498 (July 29, 2015).
60. See Press Release, Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State, Putting Human Rights at the
Center of U.S. Foreign Policy (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.state.gov/putting-human-rightsat-the-center-of-u-s-foreign-policy/.
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has been skeptical of the value of international tribunals to enforce
international law. Human rights matter, but so does state sovereignty.
Indeed, at some level, most parties to human rights instruments
must recognize the merit of this view: after all, human rights
provisions are typically left to states for enforcement and
protection. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example, the body overseeing implementation of the
treaty (the Human Rights Committee) only has the power to make
recommendations and ask states to comply with their
commitments in the case of a violation—they lack any enforcement
power. And while the Security Council theoretically could enforce
human rights treaties, it is reluctant to do so. Some have argued
that this feature was crucial for the human rights regime to get off
the ground, for governments were hesitant to accept human rights
as part of international law unless there was an “expectation that
the United Nations would respect the domestic jurisdiction of
states by refraining from intervention in their internal affairs.”61
States, at least, value their own sovereignty. And whatever the
merit of achieving human rights, they say it must be tempered by
the fact that international law should stretch only so far. The
international human rights regime, that is, must respect an
independence condition.
Additionally, some have argued that international human
rights standards are oppressive or otherwise unjust to the extent
that they impose one set of values on the world, when those values
are not universally accepted or do not have the transcendent status
of being objective. As discussed at the beginning of this Note, some
of this criticism appeared right at the beginning of the universal
human rights movement. As depicted, for example, in the
statement of the Executive Board of the American Anthropological
Association, the argument was that human rights embody only one
set of values—those in the United States and Western Europe—and
that, more generally, “standards and values are relative to the
culture from which they derive . . . .”62 This criticism can really take
two different shapes: (1) human rights standards are not
universally accepted and thus they should not be enforced on the

61. CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (2009).
62. The Exec. Bd., Am. Anthropological Ass’n, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 539, 542 (1947).
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world; or (2) no values, including human rights, are transcendent
or objective—all depend on the culture from which they derive—
and hence they should only be enforced at the level of the nation,
where such standards originate.
These two criticisms are important because their relevancy has
been overlooked and they are connected. Both go to the heart of a
persistent problem for international human rights—justification. At
the outset of the human rights project, the lack of a justification for
why there are human rights (or why these rights) was touted by
some as a virtue. Jacques Maritain, a strong intellectual influence
on the international human rights movement as well as a member
of UNESCO’s committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights,
once quipped that “we agree about the rights but on condition that
no one asks us why.”63 The goal of human rights is “a practical goal,”
he reiterated, seeking “agreement between minds . . . not on the
basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical
ideas . . . .”64 In other words, by not attempting to provide a
comprehensive justification for human rights, Maritain and others
hoped to achieve unanimity in the cause of human rights. Even
today, some scholars tout this lack of theory as a virtue of the
human rights project, allowing it to move beyond speculative
disputes and generate multicultural agreement.65
While this reticence may have proven useful, it carries serious
baggage. For one thing, it has led to a number of criticisms that
international human rights are “inherently vacuous,” and “a kind
of puffery or white magic.”66 The claim that there are human rights
simply appears, without any type of support. Alasdair MacIntyre
put belief in human rights alongside “belief in witches and in
unicorns,” because “[i]n the United Nations declaration on human
rights . . . what has since become the normal U.N. practice of not
giving good reasons for any assertions whatsoever is followed with
great rigor.”67
As for legitimacy, this lack of justification (or, really, much
attempt at justification) gives credence to the concerns about
63. Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 9,
9 (UNESCO ed., Greenwood Press, Publishers 1973) (1949).
64. Id. at 10.
65. See, e.g., BEITZ, supra note 61, at 102–06.
66. RAYMOND GEUSS, HISTORY AND ILLUSION IN POLITICS 144 (2001).
67. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 69 (2d ed. 1984).
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enforcing human rights around the world. To be clear: in my view,
the claim that there are no objective moral standards—and hence
that nothing resembling human rights can be the subject of law—
has little philosophical support. Indeed, it seems self-defeating. But
the claim that human rights are not universally accepted has more
merit. The reason is that even if all nations sign on the international
human rights treaties, those treaties themselves are incredibly
vague. This problem is compounded since, usually, there is no
authoritative interpretation of the treaties (unlike in most domestic
legal systems). The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example, speaks of the “inherent right to life” which
“shall be protected by law” and that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life.”68 At the highest level, this does not provoke
much disagreement. But what about in the details? The U.N.
Human Rights Committee, for example, has stated that the right to
life also protects the right to abortion, and not simply in instances
where the life of a mother is jeopardized. Instead, the right to life
prohibits restrictions on abortion that “discriminate against
[women] or arbitrarily interfere with their privacy.”69 Regardless of
one’s position on abortion, the notion that these protections stem
from the right to life seems tenuous at best, and it can hardly be
expected that distinct cultures would find this legal point equally
persuasive. Yet when the human rights regime lacks a justificatory
framework, it is unclear how such issues could be resolved apart
from pure fiat. And even if these issues can be resolved, there is still
the delicate issue of how to balance—if balancing is at all possible—
different rights against one another.70 As Allen Buchanan has
explained, “even the most uncontroversial human-rights norms are
not self-specifying, nor do they come with their relative weights
stamped on their foreheads.”71 In other words, a justification for
68. ICCPR art. 6, ¶ 1.
69. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018).
70. See Allen Buchanan, Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order, 14
LEGAL THEORY 39, 41 (2008) (“There can be serious disagreements, rooted in different cultural
views, about the specific content of even the most basic human rights, about how they ought
to be balanced against one another in cases of conflict of rights, and about what conditions,
if any, would have to be satisfied if they were to be permissibly abrogated to avoid a
moral catastrophe.”).
71. Id.
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human rights could provide a framework for answering these
important questions about the nature and meaning of human rights.
In the absence of such a framework, worries about the reach of
human rights seem quite troubling. On the independence
condition, we must know that the law can appropriately touch on
these issues. And for defenders of state sovereignty or those who
worry about the indeterminateness of human rights treaties, the
lack of a justificatory theory of human rights simply compounds
this problem. To address these issues we must know more than
simply that human rights protections are part of international
law—we must also know why.
III. SKETCHING A SOLUTION—THE NEED FOR A ROBUST
JUSTIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Thus far, I have argued that we can helpfully frame common
criticisms of the international human rights regime through the lens
of legitimacy. Utilizing Raz’s service conception, we can see how
criticisms about the reach of international law—from the position
of state sovereignty or enforcing non-universal/underdetermined
values—can be understood through the independence condition.
And using comparative advantage can help illustrate the meaning
of recent and longstanding criticisms about weak enforcement of
human rights and even outright harm to the cause of human rights
at the level of international institutions.
How can one go about addressing these concerns now that they
can be seen as extensions of one normative concept? There is, I will
argue, one tool within international law that could allow one to
address many of these concerns simultaneously. While it will not
answer all worries about legitimacy—especially enforcement—it
does take a step forward. That conceptual tool is jus cogens,
specifically, the method by which jus cogens are understood to be
international law in virtue of their intrinsic content.
Jus cogens (or peremptory norms) are non-derogable, general
principles of international law.72 They are, in some sense, superprinciples or axioms of international law. To count as a peremptory
norm, a principle must be “accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which

72. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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no derogation is permitted[.]”73 Not only must the principle itself
be accepted by the international community as a whole, but so must
its peremptory or non-derogable character.74 Though, at least
according to some, this does not require that every state accept the
jus cogens: “It would be enough if a very large majority did so[.]”75
As a non-derogable principle, any treaty provision that conflicts
with a peremptory norm is void.76 The power of these peremptory
norms is also cross-temporal. If a treaty is signed prior to the
emergence of a peremptory norm, once it emerges, if the treaty
conflicts with it, the treaty becomes “void and terminates” all the
same.77 Given their role in limiting the possibilities of treatymaking, jus cogens can also influence treaty interpretation: they
provide a “climate of interpretation of the intention of the parties,”
because the intentions of the states cannot violate these norms and
remain valid.78 Jus cogens also limit the actions of states and the
development of customary international law. As Alexander
Orakhelashvili has argued, this is because “jus cogens applies to
treaties precisely because the fundamental illegality attached to
certain acts is so grave that it is not capable of being legitimized[.]”79
As a result, if jus cogens did not apply outside of treaty-making,
their role in limiting treaty-making would make no sense. Given
their peremptory character—such that not even consent by treaty
can legitimate their violation—all state actions or international laws
are limited by jus cogens. The only way to modify a peremptory

73. Id.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 Reps.’ Note 6
(AM. L. INST. 1987).
75. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary Records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11, at
472 (May 21, 1968) (statement of Mr. Yasseen, Chairman of the Drafting Committee for the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
77. Id. at art. 64.
78. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 458 (1964).
79. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205–
206 (2006). But see DANIEL COSTELLOE, LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF PEREMPTORY NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (2017) (“While it is not conceptually impossible for a peremptory
norm of general international law to be in conflict with a rule of customary international law,
such a scenario remains a mere theoretical possibility. It is difficult to see how it could ever
materialize in practice. Certainly it is, at present, not possible to point to any examples.”).

1848

1849

Legitimacy of International Human Rights Law

norm is through the creation of “a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.”80
While there is no official list of all peremptory norms, some
principles are routinely mentioned. For example, the International
Law Commission recently issued a non-exhaustive list of norms
that the Commission has previously referred to as having the status
of jus cogens: (1) the prohibition of aggression, (2) the prohibition
of genocide, (3) the prohibition of crimes against humanity, (4) the
basic rules of international humanitarian law, (5) the prohibition of
racial discrimination and apartheid, (6) the prohibition of slavery,
(7) the prohibition of torture, and (8) the right to selfdetermination.81 All of these peremptory norms are also the subject of
international treaties or customary international law,82 but what gives
them the status of jus cogens goes beyond that. They are not only legal
requirements; they are also non-derogable legal requirements.
Calls for explicitly recognizing such norms came quickly
following the shift in international law after World War II.
International lawyer and judge Hersch Lauterpacht, for example,
argued that such norms are essential to public international law in
his 1953 report to the International Law Commission:
It would thus appear that the test whether the object of the
treaty is illegal and whether the treaty is void for that reason is
not inconsistency with customary international law pure and
simple, but inconsistency with such overriding principles of
international law which may be regarded as constituting
principles of international public policy (ordre international public).
These principles need not necessarily have crystallized in a
clearly accepted rule of law such as prohibition of piracy or

80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
81. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc.
A/74/10, at 208 (2019). Note that the ILC did not declare these were peremptory norms, only
that it had, in the past, referred to them as such. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Peremptory
Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens) and Other Topics: The Seventy-First Session of
the International Law Commission, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 68 (2020) (describing the drafting process
and minutes of the ILC’s seventy-first session).
82. See, e.g., U.N Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (prohibition of aggression); Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(genocide); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, ¶ 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 (crimes against humanity); the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (international
humanitarian law); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 2, ¶ 1, Mar. 3, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 1 (racial discrimination); ICCPR art. 8
(slavery); id. at art. 7 (torture); U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1 (sovereign equality).
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aggressive war. They may be expressive of rules of international
morality so cogent that an international tribunal would consider
them as forming part of those principles of law generally
recognized by civilized nations . . . .83

For Lauterpacht, jus cogens function to limit the operations of
international law—to provide non-derogable boundaries to the
actions of states. And they gain this status as non-derogable limits
because of their expression of international morality, such that they
are already, essentially, law. This point is key. The legal force of
peremptory norms depends primarily on their intrinsic content—
that is what gives them the power to act as peremptory norms.
Unlike treaties or customary law, a peremptory norm’s status as a
legal requirement does not derive solely from its source. For
treaties, it is the intent to be bound that creates a legal obligation,
and with customary law, it is the consistent practice along with
opinio juris. But peremptory norms—while they must be recognized
as such—derive their legal force in large part from the content of
the principles themselves.84 Jus cogens, therefore, act as a check on
the substance of public international law: such laws must conform
with basic principles of morality that are so essential as to be part
and parcel of the law itself in civilized nations. Importantly, the
value of jus cogens in this regard depends on its legal-moral
character. As Lauterpacht and others have argued, jus cogens are
moral principles of the greatest importance, and for precisely this
reason, they have legal consequences. As such, rather than thinking
of international law as a legal system subject to moral evaluation,
peremptory norms urge us to consider international law as a legal
system because of moral evaluations.
The key point here is the justificatory move. For jus cogens, they
are accepted as law in part because of their intrinsic content—the
substance of the principles makes them legally binding. This says a
great deal about the basic nature of the international legal system.
Namely, at root, some of its laws depend less on agreement and
more on content. In virtue of the content of a norm, we can assess
83. H. Lauterpacht (Special Rapporteur), First Report on the Law of Treaties, 155,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63, art. 15, ¶ 4, (Mar. 4, 1953).
84. See THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL
CONTRACT xxxviii (2015) (“The inviolable status of a peremptory norm is a feature of the
subject matter of the rule, rather than the legislative process through which it was codified,
and is therefore intrinsic to the norm itself.”).
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its legal character. I suggest a similar theoretical move for human
rights norms. If international human rights norms are to have the
exalted status we claim they do, then one way of grounding that
status is by making a link between their intrinsic content and
international law generally, as in jus cogens. And if international
human rights can be justified in a similar way to jus cogens, then
this can address Raz’s independence condition. In other words, if,
as a result of their content, human rights norms were binding, then
it follows that state sovereignty is not sufficient to limit the reach of
international law in this area. The reason is that human rights
norms simply are legal norms in virtue of their content and
recognition of that content. If what counts as “law” can depend on
its intrinsic content—as international law allows, via jus cogens—
and if human rights meet that standard by virtue of their content,
it follows that the reach of international law must be able to extend
into the realm of the state on human rights issues. Now, there may
be reasons to respect state sovereignty, even given the status of
human rights norms as jus cogens: but this provides a way of
dealing with state sovereignty. Though for some, this will seem like
a high cost: state sovereignty is now relegated as a backdrop to
human rights norms, and those human rights norms are very
expansive. Notice, though, that if human rights were to be taken as
jus cogens, then a more persuasive account of their content and
justification is required. That is, for human rights to meet the
concerns about universality and acceptance that the independence
condition seems to require, there must be a compelling theory of
their content (which will, in turn, hopefully, generate the type of
recognition required).
There will, of course, be challenges in this approach. One is to
explain how it is that human rights have a legal status in virtue of
their content, yet some human rights are derogable while others are
not. Moreover, if they have legal status simply in virtue of their
content, how is it that they can ever be limited with respect to other
important values? Might it be the case that this type of human
rights regime suggests a kind of universalism?
These are legitimate worries, but the issue here is providing the
correct justificatory framework, not ignoring it. The demands of
legitimacy require that we address why human rights can play the
exalted role they have (at least theoretically) in international law.
And simply pointing to human rights treaties without any theory
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of their justification does not give us an answer. Instead, as the
independence condition makes clear, we need reasons to believe
that international law should address these issues, and without
such a case, it is not clear that the international human rights system
is legitimate. Ideally, a justification of human rights would include
not only a grounding for human rights as intrinsically moral but a
subtle system of reason-giving whereby human rights norms
interact in ways that track the current human rights regime—as
limited in some respects and as balanced by other significant
concerns of international law.
But what then of enforcement? Do peremptory norms play any
part in solving that troubling aspect of public international law?
While peremptory norms themselves do not do any enforcing, their
importance lies in their ability to justify the demands of human
rights. Given the nature of human rights, voluntary compliance
with international treaties is essential. In other words, human rights
must be capable of generating compliance largely without the
means of enforcement available to nation-states. One way to induce
that compliance is by recognizing human rights as not simply a
method for improving commercial relations and minimizing
conflict (though these are, of course, very important). Rather,
human rights—at their foundation—have the status as law precisely
because of their conformity with the most essential aspects of
justice. That is, human rights are law because they are peremptory
norms. Moreover, given that the service conception entails that a
legitimate legal institution creates exclusionary moral reasons for
obedience, human rights—as jus cogens—provide the content to
precisely make those kinds of moral demands.
CONCLUSION
Making a full justification for these claims requires going
beyond the aims of this Note. Such a justification requires, most
fundamentally, addressing the nature of human rights and how it
is that various cultures can be justified in accepting them. It may be
that there are a variety of justificatory routes and that not one is
definitive. But to make a case for human rights as jus cogens (or
something similar to them) requires addressing something that has
been neglected. Yet the upshot is important. If human rights can be
established as legal norms by virtue of their content, then they have
the requisite moral force to answer important demands of
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legitimacy. And a legitimate international rights system not only
satisfies an important criterion of justice, but it may also help
promote the international human rights system and better equip
us at ensuring voluntary buy-in from countries around the world.
Given the importance of the human rights project, the upsides
are enormous.
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